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1 Introduction
In the wake of the global financial crisis, traditional 
sources of finance for large-scale, emissions reduc-
tion assets (i.e. project developers, banks, and public 
budgets) are facing very high capital constraints. At 
the same time, the need for capital for low-carbon 
infrastructure has grown significantly. The International 
Energy Agency estimates that halving carbon dioxide 
emissions by 2050 would call for approximately USD 
36 trillion to fund infrastructure investments for energy 
generation and use alone, above a business-as-usual 
scenario (IEA, 2012). The gap between what is getting 
funded and what is needed will widen under today’s 
market conditions and as new financial regulations are 
enforced (in particular, Basel III and Solvency II1). 
In order to unlock green finance, instruments are 
needed to: (1) render investments attractive to pre-
viously untapped sources of finance — such as insti-
tutional investors2 — and (2) free up resources for 
traditional sources of climate finance, particularly, 
those on banks’ balance sheets. 
First-loss protection instruments support both these 
goals by shielding investors from a pre-defined 
amount of financial losses, thus enhancing credit 
worthiness, and improving the financial profile of an 
investment. They directly mitigate a project’s financing 
risks by transferring a portion of the potential loss to the 
sponsor offering the protection that can take the form of 
a funded contribution to the investment (such as a cash 
injection) or an unfunded guarantee or credit line to be 
drawn upon when needed. By making projects more 
appealing to mainstream investors (or by aggregating 
them under the same mechanism), they also mitigate 
the perception of liquidity risks.
First-loss protection mechanisms may encourage 
capital release, in which capital previously committed 
for commercial or regulatory reasons becomes avail-
able for new uses. Amongst others, they can be applied 
1 Incoming regulations governing the banking sector, under the BASEL III 
framework, will strongly penalize illiquid assets on banks’ balance sheets 
(Linklaters, 2011) and exclude them from the assets available to cover 
liquidity needs in addition to demanding their full risk-weighted capital 
coverage. Similarly, the EU Solvency II Directive will impose more stringent 
capital requirements on insurance companies investing in riskier and less 
liquid investments such as infrastructure and renewable energy assets.
2 The term ‘institutional investors’ includes mainly pension funds and 
insurance companies, but also endowments, foundations and sovereign 
wealth funds. “With USD 71 trillion in assets under management, they can 
certainly play a major role in meeting the climate investment challenge 
(OECD, 2012a)”.
through two different mechanisms: the first mechanism 
uses project finance solutions as an alternative to bank 
loans (i.e. project bonds), while the second mechanism 
sets up dedicated investment vehicles such as collater-
alized loan obligations (CLOs).
Project bonds tap resources directly from investors in 
capital markets, either through private placements or 
through public offerings into wider markets. However, 
the current market share of project bonds, with USD 
17.5 billion, is still much smaller than the market share 
of loans, with USD 327 billion (Eckhart, 2012). This is 
because infrastructure investors continue to favor bank 
financing given a loan’s higher flexibility, in general, and 
banks’ higher appetite for risk, which results in lower 
pricing of the borrowed capital and thus lower financing 
costs.
On the other hand, the idea behind CLOs is rather 
straightforward. Banks sell some of their outstanding 
loans to a dedicated entity that then issues bonds or 
notes to investors (pension funds, insurance companies, 
hedge funds, etc.) sliced up in tranches of different risk 
and return profiles. These tranches are differentiated by 
their level of seniority.3 The banks’ balance sheets are 
freed up of these loans, leaving them able to lend the 
proceeds to new projects. Used this way, CLOs could 
thus release capital, free up liquidity, transfer credit 
risk, and improve banks’ and other lenders’ control of 
their balance sheets. However, setting up a CLO alone 
is not usually enough to attract buyers, as the loans 
underlying them are often associated with too much 
perceived risk. 
Under current market conditions, investors are 
not purchasing project bonds and collateralized 
loan obligations (CLOs) for clean investments at 
the level we would hope to see.  
For green investments, before either of these invest-
ment instruments may appeal to institutional investors, 
banks and project sponsors need to improve the credit 
worthiness of underlying projects, as both project bonds 
and CLO securities would very likely be rated as below 
3 The priority order with which cash flows originating from the pool of 
loans are distributed to investors. Usually, senior investors will have to be 
satisfied in full before other investors can be compensated even partially. 
They distinguish between senior tranches, mezzanine and junior tranches, 
and equity positions.
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investment grade.4 First-loss protection mechanisms 
are a means to achieve this as they can deal with some 
of the main barriers hindering the engagement of 
institutional investors in large-scale, low-carbon 
investments. That is, they can overcome “the absence 
of liquid, investment grade asset-backed securities and 
a small secondary market” (Wilkins, 2012).
However, designing effective first-loss protection mech-
anisms to unlock finance for green infrastructure can 
be a complex task. The architects of these instruments 
must not only understand the impact on the credit 
worthiness and on the financial profile of the invest-
ment, but also look at the cost at which the mechanisms 
can be provided, at the most effective ways to finance 
and offer them, and at the risks that they may, in turn, 
induce. 
In this paper, we highlight elements integral to the 
effectiveness of first-loss protection instruments which 
seek to enhance project’s credit worthiness, paying 
special attention to issues likely to challenge implemen-
tation, and understand whether new instruments could 
themselves create additional risks. In chapter two, we 
provide a more detailed definition of first-loss protec-
tion instrument and discuss two different proposals 
to enhance, respectively, project bonds and collateral-
ized loan obligations. In chapter three, we identify key 
lessons to improve the effectiveness of first-loss protec-
tion instruments emerging from investors’ needs, and 
from previous and on-going initiatives (we discuss two 
examples in Box 1), with particular attention to the role 
of credit rating agencies, the costs sustained by the pro-
viders and the market’s appetite for such instruments. 
Finally, in chapter four, we assess the transformative 
potential of the instruments proposed within the wider 
financial context that green infrastructure investments 
are currently facing.
Like the other Risk Gaps reports (Frisari et al., 2013), this 
work draws from a literature review and, most impor-
tantly, direct conversations with investors, insurers, 
researchers, and financiers participating in workshops 
focused on investments in green infrastructure projects 
and related risks (CPI, CBI, 2012), and on the key issues 
that first-loss protection mechanisms should be able to 
face. 
4 Standard & Poor’s rating distributions in October 2011 show that only 16% 
of project finance loans have a rating of A or higher (Wilkins, 2012). 
2 First-loss protection 
mechanisms for project bonds 
and CLOs
A first-loss protection mechanism refers to any 
instrument designed to insure the amount of capital 
which is exposed first should there be a financial loss 
on a security, including equity, debt, and derivatives 
instruments.5
First-loss protection mechanisms can address several 
financing risks and may be structured in several differ-
ent ways. They can, for example, be insurance mech-
anisms such as monolines — insurance companies 
that specialize in providing insurance to debt security 
providers who are liable to pay investors compensation 
— no matter the cause of loss. These mechanisms can 
also take the form of cash facilities or guarantee mech-
anisms based largely on precedents in the securitization 
space, such as excess spread (the difference between 
the gross yield on the pool of securitized assets and the 
vehicle’s cost of financing), cash provisions (unencum-
bered liquidity pools or contingent credit lines avail-
able in case of liquidity needs ) or overcollateralization 
(which occurs when more collateral than needed is 
posted to secure financing). Without them, investors 
owning equity positions or the most junior tranches 
would typically have to bite the bullet and accept losses 
on their invested capital.
Two recent proposals have applied the concept of first-
loss protection within the specific context of infrastruc-
ture and climate-related investments. We analyze their 
main elements briefly in the following paragraphs.
The European Commission – European Investment 
Bank Project Bond Initiative (EC-EIB PBI) aims to 
support the credit rating of individual infrastructure 
projects6 with a guarantee facility that, depending on 
the project specifics, can take the form of a funded 
subordinated debt tranche (a direct loan from the 
facility to the project that would be repaid only after the 
Senior Bonds have been serviced — hence the subordi-
nation), or of a contingent credit line (a credit line made 
5 The term security indicates any form of financial instrument usually includ-
ing equity, debt, and derivatives instruments.
6 During its pilot phase (2012-2013) the PBI will not include any renewable 
energy generation projects; however renewable energy will potentially 
be included in the final form of the facility or in a similar product with a 
similar structure, once the pilot phase is complete (EIB, 2012a). As green 
investments are not expected to require any ad-hoc changes to the PBI 
structure; we conduct our analysis in the report assuming they will be 
financed with the same credit enhancement mechanism.
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available on demand in case of contingencies that, once 
claimed, can be converted into a subordinated loan). 
As a claim that is senior to equity investors but junior 
to debt investors, the EC-EIB facility can improve the 
coverage of the senior debt7 and improve the bonds’ 
credit rating to a rating above the investment grade level 
(typically A- or higher), in line with institutional inves-
tors’ minimum requirements (EC, 2012b; Wilkins, 2012). 
The facility’s structure could potentially be used to 
finance projects at an early stage of construction as well 
as those seeking refinancing capital. That said, the PBI’s 
actual mandate is to finance the construction of new 
assets and as such, fully-built projects in the operation 
phase would not typically be considered.
Figure 1 illustrates how the mechanism works. New 
infrastructure projects (Infra projects) benefiting 
from credit enhancement, either as the “sub loan or 
credit line,” would be able to issue new, single project 
bonds8 with an investment grade level that could be 
sold to institutional investors. Whether these investors 
will have the appetite for such securities is uncertain. 
However, more than half of the respondents — inves-
tors, banks, developers, associations, and governmental 
bodies — in a public consultation held before the launch 
of the initiative responded positively on this point (EC, 
2012b). The facility is financed by a capped contri-
bution from the EU budget and by the EIB, which will 
manage the funds, assess the projects, price the loans, 
and absorb the risks beyond the EU funds. Importantly, 
pricing will be set to guarantee commercial competi-
tiveness of the facility, and not on a fully concessional 
basis (EIB, 2012a).9 In its current pilot phase, the PBI 
is expected to finance between EUR 4.5 and 5 billion 
worth of project bonds.10
Another alternative, interesting for its ambitious scale, 
has been proposed directly by the financial sector 
(by Michael Eckhart, Global Head of Environmental 
7 Debt coverage is the amount of cash available to cover both capital and 
interest payments due to lenders. As the seniority of loans determines the 
priority with which debt payments are paid, different classes of seniority 
may have very different debt coverage metrics.
8 During the pilot phase, each project will issue a single bond. The aggre-
gation of several projects into a single issue (i.e. securitization) could be a 
feature of the facility’s final structure (2014-2020). If this were the case, 
it would likely need to be set up by, or outsourced to (EIB, 2012a), a bond 
aggregator facility.
9 PBI will not be a profit seeking initiative but its revenues are envisaged 
to cover the costs (both in terms of capital and services) sustained by its 
providers.
10 The total includes an expected leverage factor of private funds over 
public resources (EU+EIB) of 5 times and will cover transport, energy and 
telecommunications sectors.
Finance at Citigroup), aiming to achieve similar 
credit rating enhancements but by slightly different 
means. Sustainable Development Bond Assurance 
Corporation (SDBAC) would establish a dedicated 
monoline entity to provide first-loss insurance to 
various project finance collateralized loan obligations 
(Eckhart, 2012). 
Figure 2 depicts the interactions between the stake-
holders likely to be involved in the SDBAC mechanism. 
An aggregator (the Global Development Funding 
Corporation, or “GDFC” in the chart) would buy or 
securitize project loans issued by local banks to fund 
green infrastructure projects, aggregate them in a CLO 
vehicle, and then market its more senior tranches to 
institutional investors. 
First-loss protection, by means of full financial insur-
ance, would enhance the credit worthiness of the entire 
securitization structure and is expected to render the 
CLO senior tranches more appealing to pension funds 
and insurance companies.11 In addition, the SDBAC 
mechanism would insulate underlying projects from 
policy and market risks by insuring their power purchase 
agreements (PPA) against government decisions that 
repeal agreed tariff systems or when off-takers default 
on payments. At this stage, a combination of public and 
private resources would finance the facility, with differ-
ent types of institutions providing support for activities 
in developed and developing markets, with grants and 
concessional finance playing a larger role in the latter. 
One option, as depicted in Figure 2, might be to call 
upon the Green Climate Fund to finance the insurance 
and reserve fund for the projects in developing coun-
tries (Eckhart, 2012).
Experience shows that providing effective first-loss 
protection instruments is difficult. Extensive and 
generous protection instruments may induce moral 
hazard behaviors among investors (e.g. an opportu-
nistic behavior by agents who are incentivized to act in 
riskier ways since the negative effects of their actions 
are suffered by the protection provider); in turn, instru-
ments that offer very limited protection or have little 
scope may fail to appeal to buyers in the market. At the 
same time, the costs associated with providing these 
structures and the price charged to investors must be 
enough to remunerate the provider without pricing the 
instrument out of the market. 
11 Similarly to the PBI, the aim is to allow the senior tranches of the CLO to 
reach an investment grade rating.
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Figure 1 - Stakeholder mapping for the EU - EIB PBI (as of June 2012)
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3 Key lessons for effective 
first-loss protection mechanisms
In the next sections, we turn our attention to the most 
important design elements of first-loss protection 
instruments and evaluate how the PBI and SDBAC 
instruments perform against these.
3.1  Matching investors’ required risk-
adjusted returns
In order to appeal to institutional investors, the credit 
enhancement from first-loss protection mechanisms’ 
should match investors’ required risk/return profiles 
compared to their business-as-usual asset allocation, 
and be more convenient than other available risk miti-
gation alternatives options (such as surviving12 or new 
monoline insurers, letters of credit, etc.). 
We have grouped investors’ requirements around three 
dimensions: return requirement, risk tolerance, and 
investors’ unique circumstances.
First-loss mechanisms should render returns sufficient 
to attract institutional investors. Recently, yields from 
12 Several large monoline insurers were hard hit by the subprime crisis in 
2007-2008 and many ceased to exist: American Municipal Bond Assur-
ance Corporation (AMBAC) filed for bankruptcy protection in November 
2010, MBIA lost its crucial AAA rating in April 2008 and was rated 
speculative grade in June 2009, Currently, Assured Guaranty is the highest 
rated insurer active in infrastructure finance (AA-/Aa3). As of early 2012, 
Goldman Sachs is contemplating the launch of a new monoline (PFM, 
2012).
renewable energy project debt have been slightly higher 
than investment grade corporate debt,13 making them, 
purely from a return perspective, a potential candidate 
for institutional investors, or at least for those with an 
appetite for the renewable energy sector. In addition, 
within CLOs, different tranches can have different 
risk/return profiles that can be designed to appeal to 
different types of investors. Nevertheless, issuances of 
project debt and institutional investors’ interest have 
been minimal to date (Eckhart, 2012), suggesting that 
even when adjusted for risk, projected returns are not 
yet competitive with other investment alternatives.
First-loss protection mechanisms should aim to 
protect institutional investors from exposure to 
project-specific risks. Avoiding construction risk is 
often a core requirement for most institutional inves-
tors — who, as a consequence, get involved only during 
the refinancing stage once construction is complet-
ed.14 Interestingly though, the EU-EIB PIB challenges 
this current practice and aims to engage institutional 
investors in the first financial closing of projects, betting 
on their willingness to take direct exposure to projects 
whose construction is not yet completed.15
On the other hand, assessments about whether the 
SDBAC proposal significantly changes risk allocation 
can only be made once the investment vehicles have 
been drawn up and the parameters of the actual first-
loss protection mechanisms established. At this stage, 
some open issues remain around the design of actual 
investment vehicles. These include questions about 
possible levels of diversification of CLOs,16 whether 
they will be cash or synthetic (CLOs whose underlying 
assets are derivatives contracts [usually credit default 
swaps] instead of cash securities), and the optimal mix 
of policy, technology, geography, and sector risk. In 
particular, the large presence of developing countries 
in the mix might demand a premium to be added to the 
13 For the US market, Mintz, Levin (2012) indicates a spread over Libor 
between 1.75% and 3.25% for mature REs (Onshore Wind and Solar); at 
the same time BBB corporate bonds yield a spread over US Treasuries 
between 1.8% and 2.5% (Bloomberg) [We note that for most of 2011, the 
difference between Libor and Treasuries has been smaller than 0.2%].
14 Typically, as the construction phase is completed and assets enter in op-
eration, sponsors look to replace initial financing (usually bank loans) with 
long term cheaper debt that should match, at least in theory, institutional 
investors risk appetite.
15 We do not rule out the possibility that construction risk will be transferred 
from investors to other parties through risk transfer tools, such as Engi-
neering and Procurement Contract (EPC).
16 Precedents in the securitization space (mortgage-backed securities) have 
shown that the analysis of the correlations among underlying assets is 
critical.
Effective first-loss protection mechanisms 
for green investments should:
• match investors’ required risk-adjusted 
returns;
• allow credit rating agencies to rate 
project bonds or pools of loans as 
investment grade investments;
• be provided at prices competitive with 
investment alternatives in the market;
• mitigate the risks induced by the 
mechanism itself;
• be provided under a “green agenda” 
to ensure resources are mobilized for 
climate friendly investments.
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structure covering for the additional perceived risks. 
Similarly, regarding the first-loss protection instrument 
itself, the extent of coverage, the size of the first-loss 
insurance, and the ultimate holder of the equity portion 
are yet to be determined. Each of these elements will 
influence the cost of financing, as well as the amount of 
risk, that is actually transferred. 
Institutional investors’ unique circumstances should 
be taken into account when structuring guarantees 
and CLOs, as should their interactions with first-
loss protection mechanisms themselves. Issues that 
need to be addressed include the length of investment 
horizon, tax considerations, asset liability management 
practices, regulatory constraints such as Solvency II,17 
environmental and climate mandates, etc. In particular, 
the liquidity of a secondary market for project bonds 
and CLOs might prove critical for the involvement of 
some institutional investors. In this respect, while the 
SDBAC proposal aims to re-ignite a currently dormant 
secondary market in project bonds,18 in the case of 
the PBI, the current credit enhancement interventions 
are on a project-by-project basis and would have little 
impact on the liquidity in the secondary market.
3.2  The role of credit rating agencies
Effective first-loss protection mechanisms need to 
encourage credit rating agencies to rate project bonds 
or pools of project loans as investment grade secu-
rities. Issuers pay credit rating agencies to perform 
due diligence on the assets, and investors significantly 
rely on their ratings to screen potential opportuni-
ties; these agencies thus have the power to exclude 
whole classes of investments from investors’ consid-
eration. According to credit rating agencies, the credit 
enhancement offered by the PBI can improve ratings by 
decreasing the probability of default and in the case 
of default, reducing the “loss given default”19 for the 
senior lenders. The impact is higher in case of unfunded 
guarantees/credit lines (as opposed to funded ones) 
17 Solvency II is the incoming regulatory framework for the European 
insurance industry. It aims to streamline the way that insurance groups are 
supervised and recognizes the economic reality of how groups operate; to 
strengthen the powers of the group supervisor, ensuring that group-wide 
risks are not overlooked; to ensure greater cooperation between supervi-
sors. The Directive is expected to be applicable from 1 January 2014 (www.
ec.europa.eu).
18 By buying pre-packaged diversified securities, institutional investors 
would indirectly help promote secondary trading of the underlying project 
bonds.
19 This reflects the difference between the face value of the investment on 
a ‘going concern basis’ and the amount that is recovered once a default 
occurs.
as these would make emergency funds available to 
projects facing liquidity shortages in both construc-
tion and operation phases (especially for projects with 
volatile cash flows); and, in case of default, the undrawn 
funds could be used to repay senior debt first, poten-
tially zeroing the loss given default (Fitch 2011, Moody’s 
2011). To date, no credit agency has made comment on 
the SDBAC proposal.
Still — especially in the eyes of insurance providers 
— the approach of credit rating agencies is far from 
perfect; these agencies should consider whether the 
investments cover risks adequately, not just whether 
they provide full financial guarantees (which is their 
standard default). The sole focus on the ability of a 
project’s cash flows to meet debt service obligations 
induces credit rating agencies to largely prefer full 
financial guarantees, instead of mechanisms that insure 
against or mitigate specific risks. Particularly in the 
current financial environment, offering full financial 
guarantees is beyond the resources of most institu-
tions,20 which could unnecessarily exclude climate-re-
lated investments from fair consideration. Finally, as 
discussed in greater detail later, full financial guarantees 
also carry significant issues of moral hazard by attract-
ing low-quality projects and, at the extreme, can even 
increase the overall risk profile of the project.
In order to avoid an extra layer of cost, due diligence 
delays and potential negative credit ratings, some 
project bonds and CLO marketers may also resort to 
private placements,21 allowing them to sell large por-
tions of debt issues directly to institutional investors 
with the ability to analyze individual projects and the 
appetite to hold illiquid assets. However, this signifi-
cantly narrows the number of potential investors to 
large institutional investors only.
3.3 The cost of first-loss protection 
mechanisms
The experience of past CLOs for projects, the lack 
of surviving monolines after the demise of mort-
gage-backed securities, and the economic and financial 
crisis all suggest that it would be quite expensive to 
increase the credit worthiness of pools of loans (or 
of project bonds) for green infrastructure projects in 
both developed and developing countries. According 
to Project Finance Magazine, “before 2007, a credit 
20 Please see the details on capital requirements for monolines in footnote 
25.
21 This refers to offering financial securities through private offerings to a 
selected number of investors, as opposed to offerings made to the general 
public.
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enhancement of around 7% was required to support 
a AAA rating for clean investments, but the required 
enhancement [in 2011] is over 25%” (…) making the 
transaction “almost certainly non earnings-accretive for 
banks” (PFM, 2011b). 
Cost components for both monoline insurers and guar-
antee providers include due diligence, credit rating 
agency fees, structuring costs, marketing support, 
and more importantly, the cost of the required capital. 
However, interestingly, apart from the novel character of 
some renewable energy technologies and the risk added 
by ever-changing support policies, insurance providers 
see no deviation between climate resilient infrastruc-
tures and conventional (i.e. non-green) ones in the 
overall costs of structuring project bonds and CLOs.
However, it is unlikely that factoring in the cost of first-
loss protection mechanisms into the pricing would 
make these securities competitive in the market. 
There is an obvious need for a sponsor. The case of the 
Asian Development Bank India Solar Power Generation 
Guarantee Facility (ADB PGG Facility) - detailed in Box 
1 - clearly suggests that, in the context of the Indian 
renewable market, this partial risk guarantee22 was too 
expensive to find any buyers when provided on a com-
mercial basis. The guarantee only became competitive 
(thus favoring its uptake) when the UK Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (UK DECC) injected grant 
money, halving the cost of the service. 
On the other hand, the recently launched Aviva 
Investors Hadrian Capital Fund 1 (see Box 1) aims 
to provide credit enhancement service to European 
infrastructure projects (including green infrastructures) 
while targeting returns in line with the markets. The 
fund will strive to increase the exposure of pension 
funds and insurance companies in project debt by 
actively structuring deals to create tradable securi-
ties. The amount and nature (in terms of geography, 
technology, policy regime) of the renewable energy 
projects that the fund will be able to make available to 
institutional investors will prove whether and how green 
infrastructure investments can compete in the capital 
markets without concessional support.23
22 Different from a first-loss protection, a partial risk guarantee doesn’t 
transfer all the risks from the investor to the sponsor but shares them 
(according to the specific terms of the facility) on an equal basis.
23 Despite counting among its investors two development banks (EIB and 
DBJ), “the fund is targeting an “attractive risk adjusted yield over the life 
of the fund “(Aviva, 2012) that in current markets roughly correspond to a 
minimum target return of 8% per annum (HWC, 2012b).
3.4 Options for financing first-loss 
protection mechanisms
In their current form, both the PBI and SDBAC instru-
ments assume that an external institution would finance 
the extra costs associated with first-loss protection 
mechanisms.24 In our assessment, to be suitable for this 
role, candidate institutions should meet several criteria, 
including the following.
1.  They should meet the capital requirement 
mandated by regulators and credit rating agencies. 
This is critical for the monoline insurance 
providers25 but also makes it challenging to achieve 
good returns (PFM, 2012);26
2. They should obtain sufficiently high credit ratings 
demanded by institutional investors: The extent of 
credit enhancement for the insured bond ultimately 
relies on the credit quality and capital adequacy of 
the institution that is the payer of last resort; 
3. They should have a “green agenda” with a 
long-term commitment to support emissions 
reduction investments; and 
4.  They should hold sufficient financial expertise 
to mitigate the risks addressed. In particular, the 
nature of the sponsor’s involvement is as important 
as the extent of non-monetary support provided 
(know-how, project appraisal, and risk management 
expertise) for the success of such investment 
vehicles.
Apart from the sponsors envisaged in the two case 
studies, we find that development banks and institu-
tions whose agenda includes capital release into finan-
cial systems (for example, the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Central Bank or the U.S. Federal 
Reserve) could be potential sponsors. Once more 
details on the design and operation of the proposed 
structures is available, it will be important to investigate 
whether those sponsors would charge a fair price for the 
mechanisms (on either a commercial or concessional 
basis), and whether these instruments will manage to 
attract developers without incentivizing only low-quality 
projects.
24 The European Commission and the Green Climate Fund, respectively.
25 Moody’s and S&P indicate that prior to applying for a credit rating, 
start-up monolines aiming to achieve credit ratings of A or above (upper 
investment grade) should achieve, at a minimum, equity capital of USD 
500 million, and have a senior management structure with a proven track 
record in providing such insurance, in addition to a period of operating 
history (Moody’s, 2006; S&P, 2011b).
26 Regulatory capital is typically constrained to very safe but low yielding 
investments (such as treasuries and government bonds).
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Box 1: Examples of implemented credit enhancement initiatives
Asian Development Bank Partial Credit Guarantees for India’s National Solar Mission
In January 2010, the Government of India launched the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (NSM) 
to promote the commission of 20,000 MW of solar power by 2022. Of this overall capacity, 1000 
MW in both photovoltaic solar and Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) have been awarded to private 
developers and should be financed mainly with private resources. At launch, it was thought that the 
Feed-in-Tariff scheme and the Renewable Purchase Obligation regulation would be enough to support 
private investments; however, the technology, policy, and commercial risks perceived by commercial 
banks and investors were too high to prompt them to commit resources with a 20-25 year-time horizon 
(UK DECC, 2012).
The Asian Development Bank subsequently partnered with commercial banks to offer a risk-sharing 
facility that guarantees up to 50% of the present value of a project’s loan. To improve the coverage 
effectiveness, but mitigate moral hazard issues, the partial risk guarantee, which is different from 
first-loss insurance, covers against all possible risks within 90 days from the event (ADB, 2011a) but 
shares the eventual loss in equal parts with the commercial banks. As such, it aligns public and private 
investors’ interests. In essence, the facility replaces 50% of project debt with typical ratings of B/BB 
with Asian Development Bank’s AAA credit rating, lowering the cost of debt financing and lengthening 
its tenor up to 15 years. 
The facility, approved in April 2011 for a total of USD 150 million over three years, had to be financed 
by Asian Development Bank Private Sector Operations Department (PSOD) which therefore charged 
a commercial fee for the guarantee. However, the guarantee’s price proved too high when compared 
with the fees investors were willing to pay. A USD 10 million grant1 from the International Climate Fund 
(ICF) halved the fees charged, reducing them to between 0.87-1.25% per annum (plus an upfront fee 
of 0.2%).2 Given the purely commercial basis of the initial fees, this case suggests that commercial 
initiatives of this kind would struggle to find a market for their services. As of June 2012, two banks have 
been approved as partners of the facility and two projects (for a total of 35 MW) have applied for the 
financing.
Aviva Investors Hadrian Capital Fund 1
Aviva Investors Hadrian Capital Fund 1 (AIHCF1) is an infrastructure fund that applies the same credit 
enhancement structure as the PBI to a broader set of infrastructure investments — including renewable 
energy ones — on a purely commercial basis. Managed by Hadrian’s Wall Capital and backed by 
Aviva Investors, the EIB, and the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ), the fund has just achieved its first 
closing with a total of GBP 160 million and will ramp up the portfolio in coming months. It will invest 
mainly in subordinated notes (rated around BBB-/Baa3) of infrastructure projects in regulated assets 
such as public buildings, transport and utilities with roughly 10% aimed to solar, wind and energy from 
waste (HWC, 2012a). Given the minimum rating requirements (around BBB-) of its eligible investment 
universe, the fund is expected to invest only in mature renewable energy technologies in established 
policy frameworks — that is, the lower risk end of the green infrastructure space. The fund’s goal is to 
enhance project debt to investment grade level, by injecting capital for 10% of the value of the project 
in notes that will be senior to equity sponsors and junior to institutional investors. The market will 
determine the subordination margin3 that the fund could earn and this, together with the fees for the 
structuring, placing and marketing of the transaction, will drive the pricing of the credit enhancement.
1 The GBP 6 million grant was part of a wider GBP 15 million ICF package directed to support ADB risk mitigation efforts between 2011 and 2014. It was 
approved by UK Department of Energy and Climate Change in the first quarter of 2012 (UK DECC, 2012).
2 Depending on the technical form chosen for the guarantee and the timing of cash disbursements, there might also be Commitment fees, Stand-by fees. 
More details on pricing are available in ADB, 2011b.
3 This is the excess return that the market awards to more speculative investments over investment grade ones.
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3.5 Risks induced by first-loss protection 
mechanisms
First-loss protection mechanisms are not a one-size-
fits-all remedy for projects whose credit worthiness is 
below the investment grade level. Some risks remain. 
The operational structures of some monoline insur-
ance companies, including the structure outlined in the 
SDBAC proposal, are geared towards providing com-
pensation based on a loans’ financial performance, and 
do not address or manage underlying risks directly. This 
can potentially even increase the overall risk level of the 
project, as the lower attention directed towards man-
aging individual specific risks increases the probability 
and severity of their occurrence (CBI,CPI, 2012). At the 
same time, as there is no aggregation of bonds in the 
proposed structure of the PBI, we expect there would 
be no pre-packaged diversification benefit for investors 
who subsequently need to screen and analyze each deal 
separately in order to build a diversified project bond 
portfolio.
Moreover, first-loss protection mechanisms can 
create extra risks that need to be borne, allocated to 
a third-party, or managed in a cost-effective manner. 
Crucially, first-loss protection mechanisms can create 
moral hazard (attract developers and banks with very 
risky projects) and may conflict with other direct risk 
mitigation instruments, such as traditional forms of 
insurance. 
In the case of the SDBAC proposal, part of the moral 
hazard risk is mitigated through the offer by the SDBAC 
to insure underlying power purchase agreements. 
This shifts part of the remedy-seeking process from the 
investor to the structure itself and reduces the conflict 
of interest.27 Even so, however, some moral hazard 
remains if the banks originating the loans to be securi-
tized do not retain any of the project risks. 
In the case of PBI, the likelihood of moral hazard is low, 
as the mechanism only insures part of the loss of the 
senior debt tranche and does not absorb any losses 
associated with the equity tranche. This minimizes the 
risk of perverse incentives to run any sub-standard 
project (as was the case with subprime mortgages fully 
insured by monolines).28 Conversely, the facility does 
27 In this case the provider of the first-loss protection coincides with the 
entity entitled to influence and approve the drafting of the power purchase 
agreement and then seek redress if the obligations under the contract are 
not honored.
28 The risk of moral hazard has been quoted by the EC as the main reason for 
not considering a full debt service guarantee, as a monoline insurer would 
do (EC, 2011).
not directly address other issues that could similarly 
constrain the bonds’ rating and investors’ subsequent 
involvement — the quality and creditworthiness of the 
off-taker, sovereign and policy risks, as well as construc-
tion and operational risks. 
Finally, we note that, in the past, most mortgage-backed 
securities structures collapsed because of disruptive 
derivatives activities.29 It will be important to consider 
whether this risk is tangible for new project finance 
CLOs, and whether it can be sufficiently regulated or 
addressed in the case of emissions reduction project 
CLOs. Failure to do so could entail significant potential 
reputation risk, and more tangible financial losses, for 
the stakeholders.
29 See for reference, the collapse of several monolines of good standing 
in 2008 due to the unconstrained size of the derivatives market which 
dwarfed the cash market against which it was referenced.
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4 Unlocking the 
transformative potential of 
credit-enhanced debt securities
In this chapter, we assess the transformative potential 
of the instruments proposed within the wider financial 
context that green infrastructure investments are cur-
rently facing.
Effective first-loss protection mechanisms 
have the potential to help solve the 
overarching green infrastructure financing 
problem, beyond the immediate release of 
local banks’ capital.
However, to leverage their transformative 
potential, first-loss protection mechanisms 
must appeal to investors and the banking 
sector, must be available while need is high, 
and mobilize the freed-up capital towards 
green investments. 
Unless first-loss protection mechanisms and their 
underlying objectives appeal to investors and the 
banking sector, they will not create liquidity on banks’ 
balance sheets nor will they mobilize resources at scale 
for green infrastructure investments. In the case of both 
the PBI and SDBAC proposals different groups of 
financial intermediaries have to be engaged: initial 
lenders, originators, banks (as arrangers of the financing 
and marketers for the bonds), and investors. While 
emissions reduction project CLOs should theoretically 
be attractive to banks eager to alleviate their balance 
sheets, the details of individual pools originated, and the 
appetite of the capital markets for these pooled securi-
ties, will determine the success of the initiative. 
Emissions reduction project CLOs and first-loss 
protection mechanisms need to be established 
quickly while there is urgent need and high demand. 
Structuring individual emissions reduction project CLOs 
themselves requires a considerable investment of time, 
and the short history of similar vehicles suggests that 
project finance CLOs have a fairly high rate of failure 
(see for reference the issuance of Gable Funding CLO 
structured by the Lloyds Banking Group in March 
2011).30 This means there are obvious tensions between 
30 In March 2011, Lloyds Banking Group held investor roadshows for Gable 
Funding, a USD 2.45 billion AAA rated (and A for a fourth tranche) project 
finance CLO that effectively repacked around 60 of its loans to UK low risk 
setting up new institutions offering the required level of 
first-loss protection, and having the instruments ready 
within the right timeframe.
It is also difficult to assess if first-loss protection 
mechanisms are a real game changer. A number of 
factors will have bearing on their potential to scale and 
the outcomes to which proceeds are directed. 
In their current and envisaged forms, provided that the 
targeted resources are mobilized (as in the case of the 
contribution from the Green Climate Fund for example), 
we estimate that the potential of the SDBAC proposal 
to achieve scale is significant, but so are the issues and 
the complexities that its proponents will have to face. 
As for the PBI, its current potential to mobilize resources 
for green investments is limited by the constrained 
scope of the pilot phase (covering only transmission, 
transport and broad-band European infrastructure). 
However, the EC and EIB aspire that, should the pilot 
phase be completed successfully, the scale and scope of 
the facility would be increased to include, among other 
kinds of projects, renewable energy generation (EC, 
2012b; EIB, 2012a).31 
For the SDBAC proposal in particular, unless specific 
strategies are adopted to direct the uses of proceeds, 
there is a risk that banks may reallocate capital toward 
a wide range of investment outcomes. Some of these 
could lead to adverse climate outcomes, such as 
decisions to fund GHG-emitting projects (e.g. coal-
fired plants), while others may be unrelated (financing 
hospitals, for instance). Banks could also use increased 
liquidity to exit from project finance activities if the 
profitability of new emissions reduction projects do 
not keep pace with the loans sold off. At this stage, it is 
not possible to assess how tangible this risk is, and we 
note that such an outcome would defeat the purpose 
of creating such complex and costly arrangements. A 
number of possible strategies could help to link sec-
ondary market transactions to action in the primary 
debt markets, to tap the leverage potential of increased 
liquidity:
 • Require banks to earmark part or all of 
the proceeds from capital release to new 
emissions reduction projects. Particular 
stakeholders such as the sponsoring institutions 
profile assets. The deal was credit enhanced with a 25% first-loss piece 
and a yield reserve account close to 10% the size of the issue. Despite this, 
the CLO did not attract investors (PFM, 2011a and PFM, 2011b).
31 In a public consultation performed by the EC, investors have expressed 
interest for more sectors to be included in the PBI: Social infrastructure 
(25%), Renewables (16%), Water and Waste (13% and 6%) (EC, 2011).
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paying for the mechanism, or umbrella orga-
nizations of climate-committed institutional 
investors, could be well positioned to make 
purchases contingent on uses. Alternately, 
banks could choose to earmark independent-
ly.32 However, earmarking may only be partially 
effective as banks could find clever ways to 
circumvent such constraints.
 • Aggregate projects at different stages of 
development into collateralized loan obli-
gations. Institutional investors tend to shy 
away from construction risks, while credit 
rating agencies are likely to downgrade 
ratings for these kinds of investment vehicles. 
Diversification benefits embedded in pooled 
investment vehicles that combine loans issued 
by projects at different stages of development 
would offset the impact of new projects and 
strongly mitigate this risk. 
 • Extend the scope of the capital release beyond 
clean investments. There is a risk that insti-
tutional investors may not be willing to pay a 
premium for loans to clean investments or may 
see a lack of diversification when investing in 
these investment vehicles. An alternative to 
the proposals could be to allow banks to sell 
loans beyond emissions reduction projects to 
CLOs (hospitals, airports, and other infrastruc-
ture projects). Associating a broader capital 
release with a capital release for new emissions 
reduction projects could increase the transfor-
mative potential of the mechanism.
32 An example of voluntary earmarking is Green Investment Schemes for 
state-level Kyoto Protocol AAU trading. The use of such proceeds from 
trading is rather opaque to properly track end uses and evaluate the 
effectiveness though.
5 Final remarks
First-loss protection instruments can make green 
investments more suitable for a wider base of financial 
investors, institutional ones in particular, by mitigating 
project financing risks, enhancing their credit profile, 
and improving liquidity. To be effective, however, credit 
rating agencies need to judge that these instruments 
significantly improve the project’s credit worthiness. 
At the same time, they need to appeal to financial 
markets (banks and investors). To reach their potential, 
these instruments require sponsors with substantial 
resources, financial expertise, and a committed green 
agenda. In addition, the costs and complexity entailed 
must be contained to make the instrument competitive 
with investment alternatives and with the cost of the 
risks they mitigate. 
It is too early to conduct a full evidence-based assess-
ment of the effectiveness of new risk mitigation instru-
ments; without a longer history of risks and experience 
with the instruments, there are just not enough evi-
dence and data. This paper aims, instead, to highlight 
the design issues we consider critical for effective 
risk solutions for low carbon investments. We hope to 
prompt a debate amongst practitioners, investors, and 
policymakers around these recommendations. 
While there is real potential for first-loss protection and 
similar credit enhancement tools to mobilize resources 
at scale for green investments, whether or not finan-
cial sponsors, developers, banks and investors opt to 
invest in them will ultimately prove these instruments’ 
effectiveness.
 15A CPI Report
Risk Gaps: First-Loss Protection MechanismsJanuary 2013
6 References
ADB. 2011a. “ADB’s Solar Power Generation Guarantee 
Facility in India.” Asian Development Bank. http://
www.adb.org/sites/default/files/solar-pow-
er-guarantee-facility.pdf
ADB. 2011b. “Key Terms and Conditions for the 
Solar Power Generation Guarantee Facility.” 
Asian Development Bank. http://www2.adb.
org/Documents/Supplementary-Appendix-
es/44941/44941-01-IND-SA.pdf
ADB. 2012. “India Solar Generation Guarantee Facility.” 
Asian Development Bank. http://www.adb.org/
site/private-sector-financing/india-solar-genera-
tion-guarantee-facility
Aviva. 2012. “Aviva Investors announces first close of 
infrastructure debt fund, Aviva Investors Hadrian 
Capital Fund 1”, Aviva Investors. http://www.
avivainvestors.co.uk/media-centre/2012-archive/
xml_027993.html
BNEF. 2010. “Crossing the Valley of Death.” Bloomberg 
New Energy Finance. https://www.bnef.com/
WhitePapers/download/29
Climate Bond Initiative, Climate Policy Initiative, 2012. 
“Renewable Energy Policy Risk Insurance: a way 
forward”. Report from roundtable held at Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch (BoAML) on 27 June 2012, 
London.
DBAM. 2009. “US GAAP - FASB 157-4, Fair Value 
Measurement”. Deutsche Insurance Asset Man-
agement.
DB. 2011. “Solvency II and Basel III: Reciprocal effects 
should not be ignored”. Deutsche Bank Research. 
EC. 2011. “Europe 2020 Project Bond Impact Assess-
ment – EC Communication”. European Com-
mission. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
financial_operations/investment/europe_2020/
documents/sec2011_1237_en.pdf
EC. 2012a. “The Project Bond Initiative – Investment 
Needs”. European Commission. http://ec.europa.
eu/economy_finance/financial_operations/invest-
ment/europe_2020/investment_needs_en.htm
EC. 2012b. “Public consultation on the Europe 2020 
Project Bond Initiative: Key messages”. European 
Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/consultation/pdf/bonds_consultation_
en.pdf
EIB. 2012a. “Personal Communication on November 
15th”. European Investment Bank, 15 November 
2012.
EIB. 2012b. “An outline guide to Project Bonds Credit 
Enhancement and the Project Bonds Initiative”. 
European Investment Bank http://www.eib.org/
attachments/documents/project_bonds_guide_
en.pdf
Eckhart M. 2012. “Preliminary Concept Paper: Sustain-
able Development Bond Assurance Corporation.” 
Citigroup.
Fitch. 2011. “Fitch Ratings: Fitch Comments on EU 
Project Bonds Initiative”. FitchRatings. http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/economy_finance/financial_operations/
investment/europe_2020/documents/fitch_com-
ments_on_eu_project_bonds_initiative.pdf
Frisary, G., M. Hervè-Mignucci, V. Micale, F. Mazza. 
2013. “Risk Gaps”. Venice: Climate Policy Initiative.
Gatti, S. 2008. “Project Finance in Theory and Practice. 
Designing, Structuring and Financing Private 
and Public Projects.” In Academic Press Advanced 
Finance Series: p. 414.
Groobey, C., J. Pierce, M. Faber, G. Broome. 2010. 
“Project Finance Primer for Renewable Clean Tech 
Project.” Wislon Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. 
HWC. 2012a. “Hadrian’s Wall Capital. Providing Com-
petitive Long Term Senior Debt: an Introduction”. 
Hadrian’s Wall Capital.
HWC. 2012b. Personal Communication, London No-
vember 29th 2012. Hadrian’s Wall Capital.
IEA. 2011a. ”World Energy Outlook 2011”. OECD/IEA. 
IEA. 2011b. ”Deploying Renewables 2011”. OECD/IEA. 
IEA. 2012. “Energy Technology Perspectives 2012”. 
OECD/IEA. http://www.iea.org/w/bookshop/add.
aspx?id=425
Lam, D., 2006. “Credit Enhancement in Securitization”, 
Asia Pacific Finance and Development Center. 
Linklaters. 2011. “Basel III: Liquidity Rules”. Linklaters. 
Mintz Levin. 2012. “Renewable Energy Project Finance 
in the U.S.: 2010-2013 Overview and Future 
Outlook”. Mintz Levin, Boston. http://www.mintz.
com/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Down-
load.aspx?EntryId=231&PortalId=0&Download-
Method=attachment
Moody’s. 2006. “Moody’s Rating Methodology for the 
Financial Guaranty Insurance Industry.” Moody’s.
 16A CPI Report
Risk Gaps: First-Loss Protection MechanismsJanuary 2013
Moody’s. 2011. “Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative”. 
Moody’s Investors Services. http://www.moodys.
com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?do-
cid=PBC_133841
OECD. 2012a. “The Role of Institutional Investors in 
Financing Clean Energy.” OECD.
PFM. 2000. “CLOs trophobia?”. Project Finance Maga-
zine, 01 August 2000.
PFM. 2008. “Down cycle means recycle”. Project 
Finance Magazine, 19 November 2008.
PFM. 2011a. “Lloyds brings cash project CLO to market”. 
Project Finance Magazine, 08 March 2011.
PFM. 2011b. “Gable Funding pulled”. Project Finance 
Magazine, 12 April 2011.
PFM. 2012. “Goldman Sachs plots monoline venture”. 
Project Finance Magazine, 19 March 2012.
Purka, D. 2012. “Solar Power in India: ADB’s Guarantee 
Facility and Technical Assistance Program.” Asia 
Clean Energy Forum, Manila 2012.
Richardson J., M. Wilkins, V. Bruggeman, and M. Beyzh. 
2010. “Can Capital Markets Bridge the Climate 
Change Financing Gap?”. Parhelion Underwriting 
Ltd and Standard & Poor’s. http://www.envi-
ronmental-finance.com/download.php?files/
pdf/4cc006c89e09a/Parhelion_Climate_Financ-
ing_Risk_Mapping_Report_2010.pdf
S&P. 2011a. “How Europe’s Initiative To Stimulate 
Infrastructure Project Bond Financing Could Affect 
Ratings”. Credit FAQ, Standard and Poor’s. http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/financial_oper-
ations/investment/europe_2020/documents/
how_europes_initiative_to_stimulate_infrastruc-
ture_16052011.pdf
S&P. 2011b. “Bond Insurance Rating Methodology and 
Assumptions.” Global Credit Portal, Standard 
and Poor’s. http://www.standardandpoors.com/
ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=PDF&asset-
ID=1245321473227
UK DECC. 2012. “Intervention Summary: UK-ADB 
Private Sector Guarantee Partnership.” UK 
DECC. http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/
tackling-climate-change/international-cli-
mate-change/4781-business-case-for-india-so-
lar-power-generation-gua.pdf
WEF. 2012. “Unlocking Financing for Clean Energy 
in Kenya”. World Economic Forum -Workshop, 
Nairobi, 15 May 2012. http://www.decc.gov.uk/
assets/decc/11/tackling-climate-change/interna-
tional-climate-change/5507-cmci-nairobi-work-
shop-summary.pdf
Wilkins, M. 2012. “Evaluating Investor Risk in Infrastruc-
ture Projects”. Presented at: OECD Expert Meeting 
- Session IV - Mobilizing Private Investment in 
Low-Carbon, Climate-Resilient Infrastructure. 
Paris, 2012.
Wynn, G. 2012. ”Why project bonds are a good idea.” 
London: Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/05/25/us-energy-bond-idUS-
BRE84O0BP20120525
